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Introduction
Publication of defamatory falsehoods is recognized as a criminal
offense or an actionable wrong, or both, in nearly every modem sys-
tem of law. However, libel law frequently collides with freedom of
the press.' In the United States, as in other democracies, libel is con-
sidered the principal legal threat to the press. 2
A surge in libel lawsuits against the media in the early 1980s
brought the dilemma into sharper focus.3 Judge Robert Bork, then of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, ar-
gued in 1984: "It arouses concern that a freshening stream of libel
actions, which often seem as much designed to punish writers and
publications as to recover damages for real injuries, may threaten the
public and constitutional interest in free, and frequently rough,
discussion." 4
Faced with costly expenses of libel lawsuits,5 the American press
during the past decade started resorting to counterclaims as an "ag-
gressive-offense-is-the-best-defense" tactic in response to what it con-
sidered to be meritless libel actions. Journalist-turned-media attorney
Bruce Sanford wrote recently that counterclaims have become "more
prevalent" in libel cases as media defendants grow more resentful of
the frivolous suits filed against them for publishing negative stories."
The late Washington syndicated columnist Drew Pearson's judi-
cial aggressiveness in libel litigation, dating back more than a half-
century, illustrates that journalists historically have been willing to
play the role of plaintiffs in courts of law. During a career that
spanned nearly four decades, Pearson's columns resulted in the filing
of more than one hundred libel actions.7 Extremely successful as a
1. Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court has noted that "[whatever is
added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 36 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
2. David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, in REFORMING LIBEL LAW 2
(John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992).
3. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS (1986) (analyzing recent law-
suits brought against the media).
4. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
5. See Bruce W. Sanford, Libel Suit, Countersuit, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., June
1985, at 16 (noting the "breathtaking cost of an adequate legal defense," which ranged
from $250,000 for a "simple" trial to eight figures for high-profile cases).
6. BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 696 (2d ed. 1994).
7. The suits were brought against Pearson himself or newspapers that published his
column. Included in this figure are 68 actions brought by Ohio Congressman Martin L.
Sweeney. Douglas A. Anderson, Drew Pearson: A Name Synonymous with Libel Actions,
56 JOURNALISM Q. 235, 235 n.1 (1979).
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libel suit defendant, Pearson paid court-directed damages in only one
action brought against him during his lifetime.8
Though he prided himself on 'being thick-skinned, Pearson did
not take lightly some of the harsh criticism often directed at him.9
The columnist knew the odds against winning but nevertheless filed at
least fifteen libel actions. 10 A pioneer in Washington-based political
reporting and a staunch defender of First Amendment freedoms,
Pearson seemed to relish and take great delight in going on the offen-
sive-a strategy that media outlets are using with greater frequency in
today's legal climate."
Media countersuits have attracted more attention from journal-
ists and scholars in recent years than ever before. Several journalism
and legal commentators have examined the feasibility of media
countersuits and other related issues.'2 Thus far, however, the statu-
tory and judicial status of media countersuits has rarely been ana-
lyzed. This is especially the case with often-cited treatises on libel
law. 3
This study examines media libel countersuits to address the'criti-
cal isstie raised by some commentators in the mid-1980s about the un-
certain value of the suits.14 Three questions provide the main focus of
8. Pearson's single loss came at the hands of former United States Assistant Attorney
General Norman Littell. For a discussion of the case, Littell v. Pearson, No. 49-2959
(D.D.C. May 15, 1953), see DOUGLAS A. ANDERSON, A "WASHINGTON MERRY-Go-
ROUND" OF LIBEL ACTIONS 143-48 (1980).
9. 'ANDERSON, supra.note 8, at 47, 236.
10. Id. at 244.'
11. See discussion infra part II.B.
12. See, e.g., Jana Miller Brewer, "We're Mad as Hell and We Aren't Going to Take It
Anymore": The Press Responds to Meritless Libel Suits, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 45 (1986);
Laura B. Choper, The Charge Is Libel: The Best Defense Is an Aggressive Offense When a
Public Official Sues the Media, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999 (1989); Seth Goodchild,
Media Counteractions: Restoring the Balance to Modern Libel Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 315
(1986); Sam Riley, Fighting Back: What Redress Media Have Against Frivolous Libel Suits,
59 JOURNALISM Q. 566 (1982); Viveca Novak & William E. Francois, Fighting Back on the
Libel Front, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar./Apr. 1989, at 46; Steve Weinberg, Libel: The
Press Fights Back, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1983, at 65.
13. See SLADE R. METCALF, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCAST-
ERS AND REPORTERS 1S-225 to 1S-226 (1994); ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON,
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1994) (media countersuits not dis-
cussed); SANFORD, supra note 6, at 696-97; RODNEY A. SMoLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMA-
TION 13-7 (1994).
14. See Jay Cutting & Lee Levine, Fighting Back-Media Lawyers. Are Developing
New Tactics to Discourage Libel Suits, 3 COMM. LAW., Fall 1985, at 12-13 (stating that
"[u]nfortunately, the law in this area [media countersuits] is so new, and the number of
reported decisions so few, that it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the efficacy of
these related causes of action" such as abuse of process and malicious prosecution, as well
as motions for attorney fees).
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this study. First, why do American media organizations countersue?
Second, what is the statutory and judicial status of media countersuits
in the United States? And finally, what implications do media
countersuits carry for American libel law?
I
Media Fighting Back: Why?
When compared to other legal systems, such as Great Britain's,
American libel law gives less respect to reputation than to press free-
dom. The contrast between English and American laws is derived not
so much from the devaluing of reputation in America as from a "spe-
cial position" of the press in the American system against inhibiting
libel laws.' 5 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the social value of a good name: "Society has a pervasive and
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation.' 16
The primary objectives of American libel law are not limited to
protection of the "relational interest" of an individual from unwar-
ranted injury. The law provides a compensation mechanism for those
who suffer economic loss or emotional distress from defamation. 17 It
further promotes human dignity by providing a civilized forum in
which a court can declare that the libelous attack on the victim was
unjustified.' 8 Libel law also serves two important societal interests.'9
First, it deters the publication of false and injurious speech.2" Second,
the law provides a check on the media's power by opening up the
media's editorial processes to public scrutiny.2'
But what would result if libel law did not perform any of its as-
sumed functions, relational or societal? In other words, is it possible
for libel law to be misused to seek interests unrelated to the policy
justifications underlying it? Professor Marc Franklin of Stanford Law
School has argued that "perhaps half of all libel cases are 'nuisance'
cases, in the sense that they have no plausible hope for ultimate suc-
cess when measured by current legal standards."22 Journalism Profes-
15. Frederick Schauer, Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative
Analysis, 1 J. MEDIA L. & PRAc. 3, 18 (1980).
16. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
17. SMOLLA, supra note 13, at 1-16.
18. Id. at 1-16.1 to 1-17.
19. Id. at 1-17 to 1-18.
20. Id. at 1-17.
21. Id. at 1-17 to 1-18.
22. Marc A. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and Pro-
posal, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1983).
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sor Sam G. Riley of Virginia Tech agrees. He claimed in 1982 that
"60-65% of all libel suits are of the 'nuisance' variety. 23
Media law scholar Donald Gillmor of the University of Minne-
sota wrote in 1992 that libel suits have become a "devastatingly effec-
tive" weapon against those who dare to question those in power.24
Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski,25 a 1991 libel case, exemplifies how
libel litigation can be an effective means invoked by the powerful to
silence a media organization. Jan Moor-Jankowski published a letter
to the editor in his academic journal that criticized Immuno A.G., an
Austrian multinational corporation, for its plan to establish a West Af-
rican research facility.26
In December 1984 Immuno A.G. sued Moor-Jankowski and
seven others for libel, claiming $400 million in damages.27 The New
York trial court in Manhattan denied Moor-Jankowski's motion for
summary judgment.28 A New York appellate court in January 1989,
however, reversed the trial court's decision on the ground that the
statements in the letter were nonactionable as opinion.29 Signifi-
cantly, the appellate court took note of Immuno's attempt to employ a
libel action as an instrument of harassment and coercion, which the
court termed "inimical to the exercise of First Amendment rights."
30
In December 1989 the New York Court of Appeals, the state's
highest court, affirmed the appellate division's dismissal of Immuno's
libel action.31 In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court,
ruled in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. that there is no wholesale
23. Riley, supra note 12, at 566 (quoting Larry Worrall, President and General Coun-
sel of Media Professionals Insurance Co.).
24. DONALD M. GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW at ix
(1992).
25. 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991).
26. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1821, 1822-23 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987). Immuno planned to use captured wild chimpanzees for medical research
on hepatitis and then return them to the wild. Id. In the letter, Immuno's plan was charac-
terized as a violation of international policies protecting chimpanzees as an endangered
species. Id. at 1825.
27. Anthony Lewis, Abusing the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1991, at A31. By 1991, all
defendants except Moor-Jankowski had settled with the plaintiff "for substantial sums."
Immuno A.G., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1824.
28. Immuno A.G., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1827.
29. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1989).
30. Id. at 137.
31. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 549 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y. 1989). The court held
that the challenged statements were constitutionally privileged opinion under both the
New York Constitution and the United States Constitution. Id. at 135. In February 1990
the court rejected Immuno's motion to reargue. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 552
N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1990).
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First Amendment exemption of opinion from libel suits. 32 The Court
subsequently vacated the Immuno decision of the New York Court of
Appeals and remanded it for further consideration. 33 In 1991 the New
York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier ruling, arguing that the
letter to the editor was protected opinion under the New York Consti-
tution and the common law of New York.34
Moor-Jankowski, the victorious defendant in what columnist
Anthony Lewis termed as perhaps "the single most outrageous libel
case-the worst abuse of the legal process" in American law,35 wrote
about the "real-life" impact of the Immuno action upon him:
The court victory may still not effectively protect me or other
editors of small professional journals from the chilling effect of suits
by wealthy corporations using our legal system to discourage criti-
cism of their activities. We need a legal deterrent to prohibit costly,
meritless libel suits that misuse the court system to undermine our
First Amendment.3
6
The Immuno case is strikingly similar to an increasing number of
SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) suits. 37 A
California appellate court characterized SLAPP suits as "an effort to
punish political opponents for past behavior, an attempt to preclude
their future political effectiveness, the desire to warn others that polit-
ical opposition will be punished, the use of the judicial system as part
of an economic strategy, or some combination of the above attrib-
utes. '38 According to a 1993 study the average SLAPP suit involves
$9 million in damages and takes three years to litigate.39 About ninety
percent of such suits end in the defendants' favor "if they can hang on
that long."40
Defamation is the most frequently used cause of action in SLAPP
suits. 41 In marked contrast with most libel actions, however, SLAPP
suits are aimed at private individuals and organizations. To date, few
32. 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1990).
33. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
34. Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (N.Y. 1991).
35. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 211 (1991).
36. J. Moor-Jankowski, M.D., View from Inside a Landmark Libel Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1991, at A14 (emphasis added).
37. For a seminal discussion of SLAPP suits, see Penelope Canan & George W. Pring,
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 Soc. PROBS. 506 (1988).
38. Monia v. Parnas Corp., 278 Cal. Rptr. 426, 435 (Ct. App. 1991) (unpublished).
39. Paul H. Gates, Jr., Words That Might Get You SLAPPed: Economic Interests vs.
The First Amendment's Speech and Petition Clauses, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forth-
coming 1995) (manuscript at 5, on file with authors) (citations omitted).
40. Id.
41. Canan & Pring, supra note 37, at 511.
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SLAPP suits have been filed against the media. While most media
organizations retain legal counsel for libel advice and often maintain
libel insurance policies, "most of the citizens caught up in SLAPP libel
suits lack such resources and expertise."42
Maple Properties v. Harris43 typifies SLAPP suits. This $63 mil-
lion libel action resulted from a letter to the editor published in the
Los Angeles Times and an open letter to the mayor published in the
Beverly Hills Courier, among others. In their letters Betty Harris,
Chairperson of the Committee to Save Beverly Hills, and others criti-
cized a proposed condominium development by Maple Properties and
supported a referendum against the development." Two months after
the development project was rejected in the referendum, Maple
Properties sued Harris and others for libel. Neither the Los Angeles
Times nor the. Beverly Hills Courier was named in the libel suit. In a
separate but related case, the California Supreme Court ruled that the
letters could not be capable of a defamatory meaning.45 On remand
the trial court dismissed the action.46 The California appellate court
affirmed the dismissal.47
Similarly, Monia v. Parnas Corp." started in 1980 when Parnas
Corporation, a San Francisco real estate developer, sued Victor Monia
and others for libel after they circulated a flier linking Parnas to al-
leged conflicts of interest involving the mayor of Fremont.49 Parnas
asked for $40 million in damages. In early 1983, however, the libel
suit was dismissed for lack of prosecution.50
One of the most effective ways to fight SLAPP suits is to counter-
sue through "SLAPP-backs" on the grounds that the original actions
were filed from spite and maliciousness in violation of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or state malicious prosecution
laws.51 In 1991 for example, Monia won $260,000 in damages in his
SLAPP-back suit against Parnas for its malicious prosecution action.52
42. THE FUND FOR FREE EXPRESSION, SLAPPING DowN CRrrIcs: HARASSMENT LI-
BEL SUITS AND TORT ACTIONS AIM TO CHILL U.S. CITIZEN ACTIvISTS 3 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter SLAPPING DowN CRITICS].
43. 205 Cal. Rptr. 532 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985).
4.4. Id. at 536-37 nn.2-4.
45. Okun v. Superior Court, 629 P.2d 1369, 1374 (Cal. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1099 (1981).
46. Maple Properties, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
47. Id. at 543.
48. 278 Cal. Rptr. 426 (Ct. App. 1991).
49. Id. at 430.
50. Id.
51. For a discussion of Rule 11 and state malicious prosecutions laws, see infra notes
83-89 and accompanying text.
52. Monia, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
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Also, Harris and other defendants in Maple Properties were awarded
$20,000 in attorney fees and court costs for a frivolous appeal.5 3 The
California appellate court said: "[T]he practice of penalizing frivolous
appeals reflects a fear that irresponsible litigants may abuse their right
of access to the judicial system. ' 54 But the SLAPP-back approach
carries several drawbacks because it can be "long and arduous" and
courts often disfavor it because it places an additional burden on the
judicial system.55
Several states including California,56 New York,57 and Washing-
ton58 have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes to deter SLAPP filers since
1989. Other states such as New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Illinois
have considered passing similar legislation.59 Under the New York
anti-SLAPP statute plaintiffs must prove "actual malice" with "clear
and convincing evidence."'  The law also provides for SLAPP de-
fendants' recovery of damages including attorney fees.61
In connection with the SLAPP-back suits, it is hardly a surprise
that media libel countersuits, which started gaining favor in the early
1980s, are considered by an increasing number of journalists and me-
dia attorneys to be a valuable strategy against frivolous libel cases.
Henry Kaufman, General Counsel for the Libel Defense Resource
Center (LDRC), has noted the "psychological effect" that the threat
of countersuits can have on plaintiffs who ponder whether to file friv-
olous libel actions.62
No matter how time and money intensive fighting back in the
courts might be, the mindset of some of the nation's editors is appar-
ent. David Hawpe, Editor and Vice President of The Courier-Journal
in Louisville, Kentucky, said the threat of countersuits should have a
chilling effect on potential plaintiffs who might consider filing merit-
less cases simply to harass and annoy the media.63 He said that the
specter of "countersuits might penetrate the public consciousness
53. Maple Properties v. Harris, 205 Cal. Rptr. 532, 543 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1054 (1985).
54. Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
55. Gates, supra note 39, at 19.
56. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1994).
57. N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.
& R. § 3211(g) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
58. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500-520 (West Supp. 1994).
59. SLAPPING DowN CRITICS, supra note 42, at 12.
60. N.Y. Civ. Rio's LAW § 76-a.
61. Id. § 70-a.
62. Vicki Ruhga, Countersuits Expensive but Winnable, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION,
1986-87, at 9 (quoting Henry Kaufman, LDRC General Counsel).
63. Telephone Interview with David Hawpe, Editor and Vice President, The Courier-
Journal (Mar. 3, 1994) (emphasis added).
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even more, further chilling would-be plaintiffs who are considering fil-
ing groundless claims. '
However, the road traveled by media organizations that pursue
libel countersuits is rarely a smooth one. It is not an easy task to sue
for meritless suits. David Bodney, media lawyer and former newspa-
per editor in Phoenix, said that the deck is stacked heavily against
successful countersuits.65 "The desire to combat spurious libel and
privacy litigation has increased," he emphasized.66 "But the ability to
recover under the traditional statutes and theories is very limited. '67
Media attorney Arthur Hanson cautioned: "Even if states allowed the
media to sue for frivolous cases, errors in stories probably would
weaken the law."'
Nevertheless, a countersuit still can prove a viable option for the
press to fight back in libel litigation insofar as an appropriate set of
facts is presented. Indeed, Rodney Smolla has characterized counter-
suits as a "newly emerging technique for 'raising the ante' in an-
timedia litigation. ' 69 Libel lawyer Robert Sack in 1985 offered a
working road map for media companies exploring libel countersuits:
1. Proof that suit was brought for reasons of harassment, par-
ticularly if the plaintiff has been involved in a pattern of similar
litigation.
2. A case that seems frivolous on its face, where what was pub-
lished is obviously and clearly true or privileged ....
3. A situation where the case is not about the particular plain-
tiff. For example, a journalist suing for libel on the basis of the
statement, "all journalists take bribes."
4. Something that is plainly a statement of opinion ....
5. A statement that is clearly not defamatory.
6. A plaintiff who refuses to discontinue the suit even when,
during the course of litigation, it becomes certain there is not suffi-
cient fault on which a verdict can rest.70
Has this road map helped media organizations to cope with libel
suits through the filing of countersuits? If so, to what extent and in
what way? To answer these and related questions, an analysis of the
64. Id.
65. Telephone Interview with David Bodney, attorney with the law firm of Steptoe &
Johnson, Phoenix, Ariz. (Jan. 26, 1994).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Ruhga, supra note 62, at 9 (quoting Arthur B. Hanson, attorney with the law firm
of Hanson, O'Brien, Birney & Butler, Washington, D.C.).
69. SMOLLA, supra note 13, at 13-17.
70. Six Signals Indicating a Possible Countersuit, ASNE BULL., Sept. 1985, at 16 (quot-
ing attorney Robert D. Sack).
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statutory and judicial framework on media countersuits before and
after 1985 is in order.
Statutory and Judicial Framework
Because meritless suits have been an issue in American courts
since the early nineteenth century,71 legislatures and courts at both the
federal and state levels have .devised several viable mechanisms
against frivolous actions. Among the mechanisms to stop abusive libel
litigation have been the statutorily or judicially recognized counter-
suits for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and actions for attor-
ney fees and costs. Equally significant are various procedural rules
adopted by states as well as by the federal government. For example,
the 1983 version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
imposes sanctions of attorney fees on opposing counsel, law firms, or
parties for frivolous litigation.72 One commentator wrote that the rule
"finally begins to hold lawyers and litigants accountable for the can-
dor and plausibility of the accusations" they file against others. 73
A. Statutes and Rules
Media organizations can rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to counter non-
meritorious libel litigation by public officials. Section 1983 provides in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.74
Section 1983 was enacted to "interpose the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial." '' 75
71. See Dana C. Gibson, When Is a Lawyer Guilty of Filing a Frivolous Law Suit?: A
Comparison Between Federal Rule 11 and Alabama's Litigation Accountability Act, 17 J.
LEGAL PROF. 237, 237 (1992).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For a detailed discussion of Rule 11, see infra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text.
73. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 323 (1991).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
75. SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 5 (3d ed.
1991) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
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In invoking § 1983 in media countersuits, a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that his or
her conduct would violate the plaintiffs right of freedom of the press
under the First Amendment.76 While § 1983 may apply to anyone
who violates the media organization's right to report freely, it is lim-
ited "almost without exception, [to] state or local officials."""
"As a general rule" in American law, the West Virginia Supreme
Court noted, "each litigant bears his:or her own attorney fees absent
express statutory, regulatory, or contractual authority for reimburse-
ment."7" But the American rule, as distinguished from the English
rule,79 has been subject to a number of statutory as well as common
law exceptions.80  For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 imposes "excess
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees" against any attorney who "so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa-
tiously."' Section 1927 is directed only at attorneys, but courts can
exercise their "inherent power" to impose fees against either or both
the plaintiff and his or her counsel. 2  .,
The most widely known avenue to media countersuits has been a
motion under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as re-
vised in 1983.83 Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reason-
able inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or re-
versal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.84
76. See Smith-Bey v. District of Columbia, 546 F. Supp. 813, 814 (D.D.C. 1982).
77. Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334,342 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
78. Daily Gazette v. Canady, 332 S.E.2d 262, 263 (W. Va. 1985) (citation omitted).
79. The English rule requires that the "losing party ... pay the winner's legal ex-
penses .... " and finds its genesis in a thirteenth century English statute that permitted
successful plaintiffs to recover "costs," including attorney fees. Synanon Found. v. Bern-
stein, 517 A.2d 28, 35 n.4 (D.C. 1986).
80. The United States Supreme Court, recognizing a bad faith exception to the Ameri-
can rule in 1975, stated that a prevailing defendant is entitled to an award of attorney fees
if a plaintiff brings or maintains an action without adequate factual basis and in bad faith.
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
82. Cutting & Levine, supra note 14, at 12.
83. This Section focuses on the 1983 version of Rule 11 in that it has been applied in
various media libel countersuits. It should be noted, however, that Rule 11 was amended
in April 1993 and went into effect in December 1993. For a discussion of the newly revised
Rule 11 and its implications for media countersuits, see infra notes 251-58 and accompany-
ing text.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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Rule 11 is intended to "discourage frivolous or dilatory litigation,
to punish abusive litigants, and to compensate opposing parties whose
expenses have been driven up or who have been otherwise
prejudiced.""5 It serves the court's objective of "streamlining court
dockets and facilitating case management."'86 Rule 11 "explicitly and
unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to con-
duct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is
signed."8" Until 1993, once a court determined that Rule 11 was vio-
lated, the imposition of appropriate sanctions had been mandatory.8 8
Included in the sanctions were the other party's "reasonable" costs
and attorney fees incurred as a result of the frivolous filing.89
Thus far, the 1983 version of Rule 11 has been adopted by several
states, with few or various modifications.' Maine and Rhode Island,
for example, have borrowed almost verbatim from the federal rule.91
The Alabama and South Carolina versions of Rule 11, however, pro-
vide for "appropriate disciplinary action" against an attorney for a
willful violation of the rules or "if scandalous or indecent matter is
inserted."'92
In addition to sanctions for improper pleadings, almost every
state implements rules authorizing the award of attorney fees for un-
merited litigation tactics. For example, the Litigation Accountability
Acts of Alabama and Mississippi provide for attorney fees if an action
is "without substantial justification," and "for delay or harassment,"
or if an attorney expands the proceedings by other improper con-
85. Braden v. News World Communications Inc., 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065, 1066
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1993) (citation omitted). The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 11 noted: "Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and mo-
tion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory
or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims
or defenses." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
86. Arbuckle Wilderness Inc. v. KFOR-TV Inc., 149 F.R.D. 209, 213-14 (W.D. Okla.
1993) (quoting White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990)).
87. Allen v. Utey, 129 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1990) (emphasis in original).
88. See Williams v. Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901, 910 (D.C.
App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)2.
90. See, e.g., R. ALA. SUP. CT. 11 (Michie 1990); IOWA R. CT. 80 (West 1995); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.51 (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. CT. R. P. § 2011 (West 1987); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-55-7 (Supp. 1994); S.C. R. Civ. P. 11 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
91. ME. R. CT. 11 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-29-21 (Supp. 1993). See also IOWA
R. CT. 80 (West 1995).
92. R. ALA. Sup. CT. 11 (Michie 1990); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.03 (West 1993); S.C. R.
Civ. P. 11 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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duct.93 In Arizona the award of attorney fees in frivolous actions is
mandated: "Reasonable attorney's fees shall be awarded by the court
in any contested action upon clear and convincing evidence that the
claim or defense constitutes harassment, is groundless and not made
in good faith." 94
Tennessee law allows costs to prevailing parties,95 but attorney
fees are not recoverable in civil actions except as authorized by stat-
ute. At present, there is no statutory recognition of the award of at-
torney fees in defamation actions. In South Dakota while costs will
"automatically" be awarded to prevailing defendants in libel cases, at-
torney fees cannot be recovered after a successful defense in libel
litigation.96
Arkansas and Oklahoma are specific in limiting the recovery of
attorney fees. Under Arkansas law a prevailing party may recover
attorney fees not exceeding $5,000 or ten percent of the amount in
dispute, whichever is less, where the action or defense is filed or con-
tinued "in bad faith" solely for harassment or malicious injury of the
other party.97 Conversely, a 1986 Oklahoma statute limits the amount
of "reasonable" costs and attorney fees for meritless actions to no
more than $10,000.98
The South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act of
1988 allows the award of attorney fees and costs for malicious prose-
cution.99 Washington is another state that permits counterclaims for
malicious prosecution." Section 4.24.350 of the Revised Code of
Washington reads:
In any action for damages.., a claim or counterclaim for damages
may be litigated in the principal action for malicious prosecution on
the ground that the action was instituted with. knowledge that the
same was false, and unfounded, malicious and without probable
cause in the filing of such action, or that the same was filed as a part
93. ALA. CODE § 12-19-272 (Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-55-5 (Supp. 1994).
See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West 1988); TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.011-9.013 (West Supp. 1994).
94. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (1992). See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 607-14.5
(Supp. 1992); N.D. CErr. CODE ANN. § 28-26-31 (1991); N.M. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.15
(Michie 1993).
95. TENN. CODE ANN. § 54.04 (1994).
96. Jon E. Arneson, Survey of South Dakota Defamation Law, in LDRC 50-STATE
SURVEY 1993-94, at 843 (Henry R. Kaufman ed., 1993).
97. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-309 (Michie 1994). See also IDAHO CODE § 12-123
(1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-32-1 (Bums 1986).
98. OKLA. CT. R. P. § 2011 (West 1987).
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). See also OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.895 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-17-12 (1984).
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.350 (1988).
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of a conspiracy to misuse judicial process by filing an action known
to be false and unfounded.1 °1
Kansas and several other states have taken steps to ensure that
sanctions against frivolous suits will not discourage potential litigants
from pursuing genuine legal actions.0 2 A 1982 Kansas statute states:
"The purpose of this section [on assessment of costs of frivolous
claim] is not to prevent a party from litigating bona fide claims or
defenses, but to protect litigants from harassment and expense in clear
cases of abuse."' 0 3 Indeed, the Revised Statutes of Nebraska disallow
assessment of attorney fees or costs so long as a claim or defense is
asserted by an attorney or party "in a good faith attempt to establish a
new theory-of law" or a "[violuntary dismissal is filed as to any claim
or action within a reasonable time after the attorney or party filing the
dismissal knew or reasonably should have known that he or she would
not prevail on such claim or action."' °
B. Judicial Interpretations
Bruce Sanford noted an "accelerating" trend among media de-
fendants to seek counterclaims in libel suits.'05 In 1985 he stated,
"Much more realistic than a Wholesale change in the rules of the liti-
gation game may be the accumulation of a case-by-case body of law
that establishes the appropriateness of nailing plaintiffs for pursuing
meritless claims."1 6
Have enough media countersuits to date been accumulated to
provide the "publishing 'rules of the road' which, if followed, will
shield prudent publishers" from libel actions?"0 7 The latest count of
media countersuits in libel law indicates that the answer to the ques-
tion.should be in the affirmative. Research for this study has found at
least fifty libel countersuits that have involved journalists and media
organizations since the early 1980s.108
101. Id. For any frivolous civil action, the Washington statute allows the prevailing
party to recover attorney fees as well as costs. See id. § 4.84.185.
102. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.2007(d) (1983).
103. Id.
104. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-824(5) (Reissue 1989).
105. Sanford, supra note 5, at 17.
106. Id.
107. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 883 (2d ed. 1988).
108. For a list of media libel countersuits, contact the authors.
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1. Media Countersuits Prevail
Nemeroff v. Abelson,"° which. legal commentators have charac-
terized as "perhaps the most celebrated and authoritative" media
countersuit,110 illustrates how a media defendant can prevent frivolous
litigation from being misused as a weapon to harass the media.
Although not a libel action, Nemeroff resulted from publication of
several articles in.Barron's Business and Financial Weekly in 1976 and
1977, which criticized the stock of Technicare Corporation."' Follow-
ing publication of the articles written by Alan Abelson, a columnist
for Barron's, the price of Technicare stock dropped." 2
Robert Nemeroff, a shareholder of Technicare, sued Abelson, the
editor and the publisher of Barron's, and several investors, claiming
that they had conspired to short-sell stock in his company in violation
of the Securities and Exchange Act."' Nine months after the com-
plaint was filed, Nemeroff amended it to charge that the investors in-
duced Abelson to write negative stories about Technicare." 4 More
than one year after filing the original action, Nemeroff agreed to dis-
miss the action voluntarily and the defendants moved for attorney
fees.115
In its initial decision in Nemeroff, the district court concluded that
Nemeroff'and his lawyers acted "with malic 'e" against the publishing
defendants, but not against the investors."16 The court agreed with the
publisher that the objective of Nemeroff's suit was to force Barron's
to stop publishing negative articles about Technicare. "[W]hile this is
not a First Amendment case," the court stated, "it is not inappropriate
for the publishing defendants to argue that the court should not allow
a party to misuse judicial processes as a vehicle for restricting the ex-
ercise of defendants' First Amendment rights."" 7 The court awarded
the publisher $50,000 in attorney fees from Nemeroff and his law-
yers." 8 The court reasoned that at the time the complaint was filed,
109. 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd in part and rev'd in part, 620 F.2d 339 (2d
Cir. 1980), on remand, 94 F.R.D. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 704 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983).
110. Cutting & Levine, supra note 14, at 12.
111. 469 F. Supp. at 631-32.
112. Id. at 632.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 640.
117. Id. at 636. The court argued that the "evident purpose [of the suit] was to secure
maximum publicity harmful to the publishing defendants." Id. at 635.
118. Id. at 642. The court relied on Rule 11 and its discretionary power for awarding
attorney fees for filing the complaint in bad faith. Id. at 637-42.
19951 MEDIA COUNTERSUITS•
Nemeroff and his lawyers had "no hard facts but only rumor and gos-
sip" in support of the charges.119
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that Nemeroff and his attorneys had an adequate factual basis for
commencing their suit.' 20 Thus, the publisher was not entitled to at-
torney fees under Rule 11. The court said that Rule 11 would be ap-
plicable only to complaints filed in bad faith.'2 ' The court remanded
the case, stating that attorney fees would be awarded to the defend-
ants under 28 U.S.C. § 1927122 if Nemeroff's litigation was intention-
ally dilatory subsequent to filing or if he failed to withdraw the action
even after facts available to him indicated that failure amounted to
bad faith.12
3
On remand the district court affirmed the award of $50,000 as-
sessed against Nemeroff and his counsel on the basis of the plaintiff's
dilatory conduct after filing, and his continuation of litigation after the
alleged facts relating to the claim had proved unfounded. 24 The court
did not cite § 1927 or Rule 11. Instead, the court relied on case law
for exercising its power to impose sanctions for bad faith litigation. 25
The Second Circuit upheld the decision.' 26 While noting "the thinness
of Nemeroff's case and the questionable origins of his suit,"'1 2 7 the
court of appeals said that the suit was continued in bad faith, which
was "well supported by the particular circumstances" of the suit.' 28
While Rule 11 was not applied in Nemeroff, it was applied by a
federal district court in Braden v. News World Communications Inc.1 2 9
The 1993 media countersuit followed the District of Columbia Supe-
rior Court's decision in favor of the defendant in a libel action.130 In
1991 Thomas Braden, former co-host of the CNN Crossfire program,
'sued the media defendant for a defamatory story published in The
Washington Times.'3 ' The article stated that the CNN decision to ter-
minate Braden as co-host of CNN's Crossfire was related to an illness
119. Id. at 640.
120. Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 349.
121. Id. at 350.
122. For a discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
123. Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 350-51.
124. Nemeroff, 94 F.R.D. at 141, 145, 146.
125. Id. at 145 (citations omitted).
126. Nemeroff, 704 F.2d at 661.
127. Id. at 659.
128. Id. at 660.
129. 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1065 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1993).
130. Braden v. News World Communications Inc., 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2209 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1991).
131. Id.
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that had left him "at times, on air [not] lucid."' 3 2 The superior court
granted summary judgment to the media defendant, arguing that Bra-
den, a public figure, did not establish the "actual malice" of the de-
fendant in publishing the article. 33
The media defendant moved for sanctions, arguing that Braden
and his attorney had failed to conduct reasonable pre-filing factual
and legal inquiries.' 34 The court concluded that their inquiries into
the relevant facts were reasonable. 35 However the court held that
Braden and his counsel had failed to investigate the applicable law
governing the "public figure" and "actual malice" standards in a libel
case and that Rule 11 sanctions were warranted against them.136
The court rejected Braden's "particularly implausible" argument
that his status as an all-purpose public figure changed to that of a pri-
vate figure when he left Crossfire.137 The court was especially critical
of Braden and his counsel's inquiry of the "actual malice" standing in
the case. Braden asserted that the subject article involved a matter of
private concern 38 and that CNN was a non-media defendant. 39 The
court dismissed Braden's contentions on the issue of private concern
as "at best, a misreading of legal standards and, at worst, a total
fabrication.' 140 Further, the court characterized Braden's attempt to
label CNN a non-media entity as "unsupported and so unfathomable
as to border on the frivolous."'' Finally, the court determined that
Braden's "actual malice" claims142 were unsupported by law or a good
faith effort to extend, modify, or revise law.' 43
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2220.
134. Braden, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1066.
135. Id. at 1067-68.
136. Id. at 1068-76.
137. Id. at 1070-72. The court maintained that Braden had continuing access to the
media after his termination as co-host of Crossfire. Id.
138. Id. at 1072-73.
139. Id. at 1074.
140. Id. at 1073. Braden argued that Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749 (1985), should apply to his case, but the court disagreed, stating that Dun &
Bradstreet "does not address the standard that should apply to public figures." Id. (empha-
sis in original) (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 1074.
142. In support of his "actual malice" argument, Braden offered "evidence" such as the
defendants' publication of the article notwithstanding Braden's denial of the source's state-
ment, the defendants' reliance on a single, unnamed source, and the defendants' publica-
tion of the article without investigating the unnamed source's statement that Patrick
Buchanan, Braden's co-host of Crossfire, was "upset," among others. Id. at 1075.
143. Id. at 1076. See also Woodley v. Hem, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1121 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. Boulder County 1989), affd, 19 Media L. Rep (BNA) 1570 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
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A Louisiana federal district court in Carr v. Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing used Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to dismiss a libel suit against
a newspaper company and impose sanctions."' Jacqueline Carr
claimed that the Times-Picayune Publishing Co. conspired with vari-
ous state officials to violate her civil right to seek public office and
damaged her reputation. 45 The court found no specific factual allega-
tions of any conspiratorial actions of the Times-Picayune against
Carr. 1
46
The court stated in Carr that the plaintiff's complaint, in violation
of Rule 11, was grounded in no theory of law or factual interpretation
and was aimed only at harassing the media defendant. 47 The court
further ruled that the plaintiff violated 28 U.S.C. § 1927 by "unreason-
ably" increasing litigation costs and clogging the judicial system with
her suit, which the court termed no more than a duplication of a previ-
ously dismissed action. 48
In Martocchio v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co. the California Court
of Appeal affirmed the decision of the California Superior Court to
assess sanctions of $216,460 against the plaintiffs. 149 The plaintiffs
sued the media defendant for broadcasting a series of reports accusing
them of committing arson for profit.'50 The trial court dismissed the
lawsuit for failure to prosecute,'15 and the court ordered the payment
of the defendant's attorney fees. 52 The California Court of Appeal
ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanc-
tions against the plaintiffs. 53 The appellate court emphasized that the
facts underlying the challenged broadcast were "indisputably" true
144. 619 F. Supp. 94, 98 (E.D. La. 1985).
145. Id. at 96.
146. Id. at 97. The court stated: "Plaintiff alleges only that The Times-Picayune con-
spired with state officials, at some unspecified time, in an unspecified location, and in an
unspecified manner, to somehow violate unspecified civil rights." Id. See also Murphy v.
Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1556 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
147. 619 F. Supp. at 98. See also Arbuckle Wilderness Inc. v. KFOR-TV Inc., 149
F.R.D. 209 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
148. 619 F. Supp. at 9& In a prior dismissed civil action, the plaintiff alleged that vari-
ous state officials conspired to prevent her from exercising her right to run for public office
by changing a home rule charter in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. Id. at 95.
149. 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1734, 1739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (unpublished).
150. Id. at 1735.
151. Id. Among other things, the California Court of Appeal called attention to the
plaintiffs' "dogged resistance" to numerous discovery requests "without any good basis for
that resistance," their apparent attempts to "prevent their own case from going to trial,"
and the filing of "a very brief, frivolous, untimely, and half-hearted opposition" to the
defendants' motion for dismissal. Id. at 1736 (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 1738-39.
153. Id. at 1735.
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and that the plaintiffs offered no contrary evidence on the truth of the
statement in question. 154
The "absolute privilege"'51 5 and the "qualified privilege" were ap-
plied by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in affirming a trial
court's ruling in a media countersuit.156 Ward v. Roy H. Park Broad-
casting Co., a 1991 libel case, involved broadcasts about a malpractice
action against Joseph Ward, medical director at University Nursing
Center in Greenville, North Carolina. 57 Ward claimed that the
broadcasts were defamatory and that the defendants knew they were
false.'58 The trial court concluded that the broadcasts were privileged
in that they were reporting on "a duly constituted judicial proceeding'
and they were not made with "actual malice," which the public figure
plaintiff failed to prove. 159 The court imposed the sanction of attorney
fees against the plaintiff.'6 The North Carolina Court of Appeals,
accepting the trial court's reasoning completely, concluded that the
plaintiff's libel suit was improperly motivated 161 and that the plaintiff
did not investigate the relevant law of fact and the interpretations of
law before filing his action.' 62
Under Rule 11 the court can impose sanctions if a libel action is
filed notwithstanding accurate quotations from the plaintiff. 63 The
district court in Willis v. Capital Cities Communications ordered plain-
tiff James Willis and his counsel to pay the reasonable expenses in-
cluding attorney fees.' Willis claimed that he was defamed by
154. Id. at 1737-38.
155. Under North Carolina libel law a defamatory statement is absolutely protected if
made in the due course of a judicial proceeding. Burton v. National Bank of N.C., 355
S.E.2d 800, 802 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Jarman v. Offutt, 80 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1954)).
Further, North Carolina libel law will not support a defamation action even if it is made
with actual malice. Id.
156. Ward v. Roy H. Park Broadcasting Co., 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2311 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1991) (unpublished).
157. Id. at 2312, 2316. The trial court applied North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure
11 in awarding attorney fees of $13,450 to the media defendants. Id. at 2319.
158. Id. at 2316. The malpractice action was a matter of public record, and the media
defendant offered Ward an opportunity for comment on the air "any time his name is
mentioned" in the news broadcasts regarding the lawsuit. Id.
159. Id. See also Straitwell v. National Steel Corp., 905 F.2d 1530 (4th Cir. 1990).
160. Ward, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2313.
161. Id. The appellate court cited the plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt' to control future
broadcasts relating to alleged abuses at his nursing home and his threat to sue if the media
organizations did not retract the broadcasts in question before he filed the libel suit. Id.
162. Id.
163. FED R. Civ. P. 11.
164. 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1683, 1685 (D. Kan. 1986).
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several statements published in the Kansas City Star.'65 He denied
making the statements that were attributed to him. 66
The defense attorney, after verifying the statements on the basis
of the reporter's taped interview with Willis, suggested that Willis dis-
miss his lawsuit immediately.167 When the plaintiff refused to with-
draw his libel action, the Star moved for summary judgment, which
the district court granted.' 68 The Star then demanded sanctions
against Willis and his attorney under Rule 11.169 The court concluded
that neither Willis nor his attorney made a reasonable investigation
into the facts prior to filing the libel complaint. 171 It further said the
plaintiff and his attorney continued with the lawsuit even after they
were made aware of the truth of the statements upon which they had
based their claim.' 7 1
In Lee v. Columbian, Inc., a 1991 libel case, a newspaper com-
pany won sanctions against Darrell Lee.' 72 Lee had sued the newspa-
per for publishing what was later found to be a truthful story, and he
also asserted an outrage claim for a reporter's attempts to interview
him by phone and in public places.' 73 The Washington Court of Ap-
peals ruled that Lee's counsel filed the outrage complaint with no in-
vestigation beyond Lee's statement that he was "outraged" with the
reporter. 74 The court also stated that Lee's defamation claim was en-
tirely misplaced because what was published in the defendant's paper
was substantially accurate. 75 The court argued that "[t]he most cur-
sory investigation would have disclosed as much.'
7 6
In Mitchell v. Herald Co. attorney fees were awarded to a news-
paper company when Stephen Mitchell and his lawyer sued for libel
for an article based on police reports. 77 The article dealt with the
plaintiff's argument with several neighbors and his arrest for assault
and disorderly conduct. Mitchell claimed that the story was false and
165. Id. at 1684.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1685.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 826 P.2d 217, 221 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
173. Id. at 219.
174. Id. at 220.
175. Id.
176. Id. See also McGhee v. Sanilac County, 934 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1991).
177. 529 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603-04 (App. Div. 1988).
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that the newspaper company was "grossly irresponsible" in publishing
it.' 78
The media defendant responded that Mitchell's action lacked
merit because he and his attorney should have known that the article
was true and that the defendant was not grossly irresponsible in rely-
ing on sworn police reports. 79 The New York appellate court in
Mitchell agreed that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from con-
testing the truth of the story because of his criminal conviction for
assault.180 The court also noted that the bad faith of the plaintiff and
his counsel was manifest in their failure to withdraw the action after
being informed by the defense attorney that the claim was baseless.
181
In Beary v. West Publishing Co. the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit imposed sanctions of double costs and
damages against an attorney for filing a "frivolous" appeal of a sum-
mary judgment in a libel case.' 2 The plaintiff, Patrick Beary, claimed
that West's advance sheet copy of a court opinion was defamatory be-
cause it falsely described him, an attorney, as a "deadbeat."'8 3 The
district court ruled that the court opinion was not defamatory and that
West was "absolutely privileged" in publishing the opinion."8 On ap-
peal the Second Circuit concluded that Beary's appeal was completely
frivolous and warranted double costs and $1,000 damages to West. 185
In Fisher v. Detroit Free Press, Inc. the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals also granted sanctions against a plaintiff in a libel suit for taking
"a vexatious appeal."' 86 The libel suit resulted from a newspaper
story that quoted a judge in another case as saying, "Fisher sought
$15,000 for the equivalent of 'loss of companionship of the sick
tree."1 87 The trial court granted summary judgment to the media de-
fendant but refused to impose sanctions.188 On appeal the Michigan
178. Id. at 604'
179. Id.
180. Id. at 606.
181. Id. at 607. The court also noted, as further illustration of the bad faith of Mitchell
and his counsel, that the complaint included the allegation that he was defamed by the
headline, "Woman Raped," of a separate article that had no relation to him. Id. at 606.
The court stated: "No reader could reasonably conclude that the headline concerned
plaintiff and no reasonable attorney could conclude other than that such allegation was
frivolous." Id. at 607.
182. 763 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1985).
183. Id. at 68.
184. Id. See also Torgerson v. Minnesota Star and Tibune, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1805 (D. Minn. 1981).
185. Beary, 763 F.2d at 69.
186. 404 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
187. Id. at 767.
188. Id. The court ruled the article non-defamatory and privileged as an opinion. Id.
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Court of Appeals imposed sanctions against the plaintiff because, as a
licensed attorney, he could have had no "reasonable basis" to believe
that his "frivolous" case would raise a meritorious issue to be deter-
mined by the appellate court.'89
2. Media Countersuits Fail
The news media have lost countersuits on at least sixteen re-
ported occasions since 1980.19 Among the grounds for their losses
have been failure to establish abuse of process or malicious prosecu-
tions, failure to establish a violation of Rule 11 or similar state rules,
and failure to establish a violation of federal or state statutes on frivo-
lous litigation. 9'
When Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada was linked with organized
crime in a series of articles published in the McClatchy newspapers in
November 1983, he filed a libel suit. 92 In Laxalt v. McClatchy the
media defendant countersued, claiming violations of its First Amend-
ment rights and abuse of process.' 93 McClatchy asserted that Laxalt
had "used his power and influence as a United States Senator to pun-
ish [McClatchy] and to burden and chill the exercise of their first
amendment rights."' 94
The federal district court in Nevada dismissed the counterclaim,
holding that Laxalt did not act "under color of law." 95 Although
Laxalt wrote a letter on Senate stationery demanding a retraction and
the release to law enforcement agencies of the information and
sources for the articles, 96 the court said:
189. Id. at 769.
190. See Perk v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 931 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1991); Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 501 U.S. 496
(1991); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989); Hansen v. Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 788 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1986); Federal Beef Processors, Inc. v. CBS Inc., 864 F.
Supp. 127 (D.S.D. 1994); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. Supp. 737 (D. Nev. 1985); Rewald v.
Western Sun, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2494 (D. Haw. 1985); Church of Scientology v.
Siegelman, 94 F.R.D. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Heuisler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 812 P.2d
1096 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Sallomi v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 771 P.2d 469 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1989); Salvione v. Desert Willow Publications, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2157 (Ariz.
Super. Ct. 1994); Walsh v. Bronson, 245 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1988); Howard v. Oak-
land Tibune, 245 Cal. Rptr. 449 (Ct. App. 1988); Stevens v. Independent Newspapers, Inc.,
15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1097 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988); McGill v. Parker, 582 N.Y.S.2d 91
(App. Div. 1992); Oklahoma Publishing Co.v. Miskovsky, 654 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1982).
191-. See cases cited supra note 190; see also discussion infra part II.B.2.
192. Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 737.
193. Id. at 739.
194. Id. at 746.
195. Id. at 747.
196. Id.
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[A] public official must, to a certain extent, make demands that al-
leged libels be retracted. In that the official is required to do so, the
simple fact that they are made emphatically and on official station-
ery does not indicate that they were also made under color of state
or federal law. 19
7
The court also rejected McClatchy's assertion that Laxalt's action was
designed to harass the media defendant. 198 Noting the "generous"
Sullivan standards for libel defendants, the court held that to allow a
countersuit under these circumstances would result in "exactly the
form of 'double counting"' for the defendants that the Supreme Court
has rejected. 199
On McClatchy's abuse of process claim against Laxalt, the court
said that "filing of a complaint alone cannot constitute the willful act
necessary for the tort to lie." 2' The court held that McClatchy had
failed to establish any abusive measures Laxalt might have taken sub-
sequent to filing the suit, such as minimal settlement offers and exces-
sive motions filed to coerce a settlement. 20'
In Sallomi v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., a 1989 libel case, the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of attorney
fees for the media defendant.2' The Arizona Republic published sto-
ries on the basis of search warrants and a police booking slip relating
to an investigation of a restaurant owned by the plaintiffs.20 3 The trial
court, finding that the articles were a fair and accurate summary of the
public records, applied the public records privilege to the stories.204
The Republic asked for attorney fees, arguing that the libel claim con-
stituted harassment, was groundless, and in violation of Arizona
law.205 The newspaper also maintained that the plaintiffs knew prior
to filing their law suit that it would not be successful. 2° 6 The Arizona
appellate court, however, ruled that the trial court's findings against
197. Id. at 748.
198.. Id. at 749.
199. Id. at 750 (relying on Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
200. Id. at 752.
201. Id.
202. 771 P.2d 469, 470 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
203. Id. at 470-71. The articles described the restaurant as a "hangout for narcotics
dealers and users." Id. at 470.
204. Id. at 472.
205. Id. at 473. The Republic used § 12-341.01, which reads in pertinent part: "Reason-
able attorney's fees shall be awarded by the court in any contested action upon clear and
convincing evidence that the claim or defense constitutes harassment, is groundless and not
made in good faith. In making such award, the court may consider such evidence as it
deems appropriate." ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(C) (1993).
206. Sallomi, 771 P.2d at 474.
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the Republic should be upheld because of the court's "personal con-
tact" with the attorneys.2 °7
In 1986 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit rejected Rule 11 sanctions in the case of Hansen v. Prentice-Hall,
Inc.208 The media countersuit in that case grew from an allegedly
libelous sentence published in the advance sheet edition of Prentice-
Hall's court report on a case in- which Lorentz Hansen was both trial
and appellate counsel.20 9 When Hansen sued Prentice-Hall for libel,
the publishers moved for summary judgment and sanctions.210 The
district court granted summary judgment but denied sanctions.21'
On appeal the Second Circuit dismissed as meritless Hansen's ar-
gument that the slip opinion in question was not a "fair and true re-
port" of a court proceeding because the court opinion had been
revised prior to its publication.212 The Second Circuit, however, af-
firmed the district court's ruling that sanctions against Hansen were
not warranted because he reasonably believed that his complaint was
well grounded in fact and in existing law.21 3 In denying sanctions to
Prentice-Hall, the district court accepted Hansen's assertion that he
had notified Prentice-Hall that he was attempting to have the defama-
tory sentence removed from the court opinion.214
More recently, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, held in McGill v. Parker:
While sanctions for prosecuting a frivolous action are available
to a defendant in a defamation action where application of the dis-
positive privilege is so obvious that the action is clearly without any
basis in fact or law, it is not enough that the action be meritless; it
must be brought or continued in bad faith. What is required, in
effect, is a showing that the plaintiff and counsel knew or should
have known that the action lacked merit.215
McGill involved several defamatory letters to the editor and one
flyer.21 6 One of the letters was published in the New York Times.217
207. Id. (quoting Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450, 453-54 (9th Cir.
1987)).
208. 788 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1986).
209. Id. at 892-93. The court opinion in Hansen discusses little of the gist of the libelous
sentence in question. Id.
210. Id. at 893.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 894.
214. Id.
215. 582 N.Y.S.2d 91, 99 (App. Div. 1992).
216. Id. at 93.
217. Id.
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The subject of the letters and the flyer was a criticism of the plaintiffs'
operation of stables for carriage horses.218
The New York appellate court found that the statements were not
actionable because the plaintiffs failed to challenge their falsity.
219
The court further held that the writings at issue were constitutionally
protected opinion under the New York law.220 However, the court
ruled that the plaintiff's suit was not "so blatantly" frivolous as to war-
rant sanctions nor was it an "improper" burden on the court's time.221
Accordingly, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the ac-
tion was a "clear" illustration of a SLAPP suit.2
22
In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Miskovsky the Oklahoma
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the newspa-
per defendant's motion for sanctions.2" Miskovsky arose from publi-
cation of editorials and cartoons criticizing the campaign tactics of
George Miskovsky, an Oklahoma candidate for the United States
Senate.224 Miskovsky filed suit in a county district court against
Oklahoma Publishing but withdrew it without prejudice.225 He then
filed a second suit in a different county.226 While the second suit was
still pending, the newspaper publisher countersued and demanded at-
torney fees and costs from Miskovsky for his first libel action.227 It
claimed that Miskovsky had sued and used the discovery process to
prevent the news media from criticizing him and from supporting his
opponent.228
The trial court in Miskovsky denied the request, arguing that the
defendant was not "substantially" damaged by the plaintiff's dismis-
sal.229 The Oklahoma Supreme Court, affirming the trial court's rul-
ing, held that the action lasted for a relatively short time, that it was
dismissed during the discovery and before the actual trial, and that
218. Id.
219. Id. at 98.
220. Id. at 99. The McGill court relied on the broader protection of opinion under the
New York Constitution rather than under the First Amendment. For the protection of
opinion under the New York law, see Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270
(N.Y. 1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
221 McGill, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
222. Id. at 100.
223. 654 P.2d 596, 597 (Okla. 1982).
224. See Press Bites Back at Libel Suits, NEWS MEDIA & L., June/July 1981, at 24 [here-
inafter Press Bites Back].
225. Miskovsky, 654 P.2d at 597.
226. Id. In his second suit Miskovsky won a one million dollar verdict against the news-
paper publisher. See Press Bites Back, supra note 224.
227. Miskovsky, 654 P.2d at 597.
228. Id. at 598.
229. Id. at 599.
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"the expenditures were not wasted" because the parties could use the
depositions taken in the action against another libel case.23 °
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also re-
jected sanctions against a plaintiff in Perk v. Reader's Digest Associa-
tion, Inc.231 In that 1991 media libel case, Ralph Perk, a former
Cleveland mayor, sued the Reader's Digest Association for an article
in which he was criticized for his financial mismanagement of the
city.232 The district court granted summary judgment to Reader's Di-
gest on the ground that Perk, as a public figure, could not prove "ac-
tual malice" on the part of the defendant in publishing the story.233
Nevertheless, the court refused to impose Rule 11 sanctions upon the
plaintiff or his counsel. 4 The court claimed that the plaintiff's failure
to prove "actual malice" did not necessarily mean that his action was
commenced or continued in bad faith.235 In affirming the district
court's ruling, the Sixth Circuit briefly noted that the pleadings were
not unmerited.236
In the 1988 case of Walsh v. Bronson, three newspaper reporters
sued for malicious prosecution against the attorneys who represented
the plaintiff in a libel action against them.237 The California Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
attorneys because the reporters failed to pass the malicious prosecu-
tion test.238 Walsh was an outgrowth of a libel suit that stemmed from
a series of articles published in the Fresno Bee.239 Edward Bronson
and two other lawyers were retained by Edward Kashian, who was
described as a member of the "Fresno Mob" in the stories.240. While
the libel suit was settled between Kashian and McClatchy Newspa-
pers, publishers of the Bee, Denny Walsh and other reporters chose
not to participate in the settlement.241
230. Id.
231. 931 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1991).
232. Id. at 409.
233. Perk v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1115 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
234. Id. at 1120-21.
235. Id. at 1121.
236. Perk, 931 F.2d at 413.
237. 245 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1988).
238. Id. at 894-95. The'Californii Court of Appeal set forth the malicious prosecution
test as follows: "To sustain an action for malicious prosecution of a civil proceeding the
plaintiff must establish that the prior action: (1) terminated in his or her favor, (2) was
filed without probable cause and, (3) was initiated by the defendant(s) with malice." Id. at
890.
239. Id. at 889.
240. Id. at 891.
241. Id. at 889-90.
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In their malicious prosecution action, the reporters asserted that
the lawyers could not have had probable cause to believe that the re-
porters "actually" published the defamatory stories complained of be-
cause their names did not appear in by-lines on the articles.242 The
California. appellate court rejected the assertion on the ground that
the lawyers' pre-filing investigation established probable cause to be-
lieve the reporters' participation in the publication of the stories and
to believe the stories were false and not privileged.243
Implications of Media Countersuits
As illustrated by the early legal battles of Drew Pearson, one of
Washington's pioneer investigative reporters and columnists, journal-
ists have been fighting back as plaintiffs throughout much of this cen-
tury. The contemporary surge can be traced in large part to a 1983
watershed case, Nemeroff v. Abelson.'" Noting the publishing de-
fendants' argument that judicial processes should not be misused as a
vehicle for restricting freedom of the press,245 the federal district court
in New York, to an extent, opened the door for and indirectly en-
couraged subsequent media countersuits. In-essence, Nemeroff sent a
message to the media: Make no mistake, it is difficult to take the of-
fensive and win, but it is possible.
Clearly, the courts have become increasingly intolerant of those
plaintiffs whose main goal in litigation is not to right a wrong-and
win-but is simply to harass and hurt. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia held, "Although there is an undeniable interest in the
maintenance of unrestricted access to the judicial system, unfounded
claims or defenses asserted for vexatious, wanton, or oppressive pur-
poses place an unconscionable burden upon precious judicial re-
sources already stretched to their limits in an increasingly litigious
society."246
Buoyed by judicially and statutorily recognized avenues, media
outlets are becoming noticeably aggressive in their efforts to fight
back in the courts. Since 1980 they have resorted to various statutes
and rules, both federal and state, as well as case law on abuse of pro-
cess and malicious prosecutions to countersue libel plaintiffs. Thus
far, the case law on media libel countersuits has set useful parameters
242. Id. at 891.
243. Id. at 890-92.
244. 704 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1983).
245. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
246. Daily Gazette Co. v. Canady, 332 S.E.2d 262, 265 (W. Va. 1985).
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for determining if and when media organizations can fight back with a
reasonable likelihood of winning.
First, a countersuit most likely will prevail when a libel action is
filed notwithstanding the plaintiff's awareness that the precipitating
statement is true and thus nonactionable. Second, a media organiza-
tion probably will win its countersuit against a party that files a libel
action that arises from privileged statements from judicial or legisla-
tive proceedings. Third, the media organization has a good chance of
successfully countersuing the plaintiff when a libel suit is filed even
though the statute of limitations has already run. Finally, the media
can successfully invoke Rule 11 or similar state rules when countersu-
ing in libel actions in which the plaintiff attorney fails to make a pre-
filing "reasonable inquiry" about the status of his or her client relating
to the "actual malice" requirement.
As the headline that appeared over an article published in the
mid-1980s noted, "Countersuing: It's not a 'silver bullet' against
bloodthirsty plaintiffs, but it can be a useful weapon in your legal arse-
nal. ' 247 Indeed, media victories in cases examined in this study might
well provide the impetus to enter the legal arena for those newspapers
and broadcast stations that feel outrage over what they consider to be
truly meritless or frivolous suits filed against them.
On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit made it clear that Nemeroff did not create "an easy
test" for passing the bad faith exception to the American rule against
fee-shifting.24 The court stated,
Plaintiffs who have a colorable basis for a claim and who act in good
faith need not apprehend that defeat on the merits of their lawsuit
will require them to pay their adversaries' legal fees. Nor do we
mean to imply that a litigant is entitled to attorney's fees whenever
an opponent fails to conduct discovery at full speed.249
In this context, the implication of the recently amended Rule 11,
which went into effect on December 1, 1993,251 is that the revised rule
will lead to fewer sanctions for filing a frivolous claim or pleading in
the future than in the past.
For example, sanctions under the new Rule 11 are discretionary,
whereas those under the 1983 version of Rule 11 were mandatory.25'
247. Thomas E. Weber, Countersuing: It's Not a 'Silver Bullet' Against Bloodthirsty
Plaintiffs, But It Can Be a Useful Weapon in Your Legal Arsenal, ASNE BULL., Sept. 1985,
at 16.
248. Nemeroff, 704 F.2d at 660.
249. Id.
250. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (as amended Apr. 22, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993).
251. See Williams v. Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901 (D.C.
App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991).
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Justice Antonin Scalia took issue with the change in the issuance of
sanctions under Rule 11: "Judges, like other human beings, do not
like imposing punishment when their duty does not require it, espe-
cially upon their own acquaintances and members of their own
profession. "252
The revised rule also contains a three-week "safe harbor" provi-
sion, in which the motion for sanctions cannot be filed with the court
unless the opposing party fails to withdraw or correct the challenged
pleading within twenty-one days.253 The provision will allow individu-
als to file "thoughtless, reckless, and harassing pleadings," fully aware
that "they have nothing to lose: If objection is raised, they can retreat
without penalty.""25
Furthermore, the new rule will reduce the likelihood that "frivo-
lousness will even be challenged,'25 5 because it limits the award of
compensation to "unusual circumstances," with monetary sanctions
"ordinarily" to be payable to the court.256 A court may order pay-
ment for some or all of the "reasonable" attorney fees and other ex-
penses incurred as a "direct" result of the violation of Rule 11 only
when it is warranted for "effective deterrence. 25 7 The revisions con-
verted Rule 11 "from a means of obtaining compensation to an invita-
tion to throw good money after bad," according to Scalia.258
Regardless of how the revised Rule 11 will affect future media
countersuits, lawyers and editors agree that there can be merit in the
media fighting back in court. Paul McMasters, Executive Director of
the Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt Univer-
sity and President of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ), said
he supports selective efforts by the press "to be aggressive in taking
the initiative to head off intrusions in the editorial process. ' 259 He
elaborated, "Countersuits often should be pursued. Journalists should
resist efforts to be pushed around in the editorial process. '' 210
Nevertheless, media countersuits do carry a downside. Editor
Hawpe summarized one drawback:
252. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, 146 F.R.D. 507, 508 (Apr.
22, 1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Amendments to Federal Rules].
253. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
254. Amendments to Federal Rules, supra note 252, at 508 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (emphasis in original).
256. Id. at 508-09.
257. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
258. Amendments to Federal Rules, supra note 252, at 509 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. Interview with Paul McMasters, Executive Director of the Freedom Forum First
Amendment Center, Vanderbilt University, in Cocoa Beach, Fla. (Feb. 22, 1994).
260. Id.
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People already view us as too powerful, too arrogant and too in-
dependent., If in fact we created another kind of protection for our-
selves [by successfully countersuing and recovering attorney fees], it
simply would reinforce the notion that we are too powerful, too ar-
rogant and too independent.261
Hawpe noted, however, that the press "could mitigate the conse-
quences of that by using the device only in really outrageous instances
in which somebody clearly is trying to punish us by taking us to court
without any real prospect of victory."262 Media attorney Richard
Schmidt has pointed out, too, that media countersuits sometimes
backfire because they "could cause the original plaintiffs to stay [with
the action] when they might have been considering dropping the case.
But if they are sued, they might find it difficult to drop the case and
may actually extend it."'263
Clearly, the expenditure of time, money, and energy (which usu-
ally are in short supply) required when filing countersuits is a strong
deterrent to many media outlets that contemplate such action. And,
even when successful, the fees they recover are often only a fraction of
their actual costs.
IV
Summary and Conclusions
Without doubt, libel law has been abused through the years by
plaintiffs whose primary motive has not been to clear their good
names but to merely harass, irritate, vex, punish, annoy, 'or-even
worse-silence the press. Public person plaintiffs and their attorneys
know full well that they have virtually no chance of winning most libel
suits.
Interestingly, however, media defendants in recent years have
done more than merely breathe a sigh of relief when a judgment is
handed down in their favor. They are backing up their tough talk
about those who file frivolous suits against them by using statutory
and judicial methods to fight back. In mounting numbers media de-
fendants are attempting to calm their anger and soothe their frustra-
tions by seeking to recover costs and attorney fees from those who
they claim have filed meritless actions against them.
The seeds were sown in cases handed down in the early 1980s as
well as through the passage of federal and state laws during that dec-
261. Hawpe, supra note 63.
262. Id.
263. Telephone Interview with Richard Schmidt, attorney with the law firm of Cohn &
Marks, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 26, 1994).
[Vol. 17:383
ade making it increasingly possible for media outlets to successfully
countersue plaintiffs who• have brought 'frivolous actions. The media
countersuits, which gained notoriety in the early and mid-1980s as an-
other weapon in the media's legal repository, became increasingly
common later in that decade and in the early 1990s. The majority
(thirty-four) of the fifty-one countersuits examined in this Article
have been decided since 1986. It is especially significant that media
countersuits have been successful seventy percent of the time between
1980 and 1994. That is, the countersuits have prevailed in thirty-five
of the fifty-one libel cases during the period under study. The press
seems to be sending a message to parties who seek merely to stifle
them: Sue at your peril because we are going to come back after you.
Courts at both the federal and state levels have been consistent in
holding that plaintiffs cannot bring suits merely to harass media de-
fendants. Courts have looked with disdain on such conduct because,
in addition to diluting the First Amendment rights of media defend-
ants, such actions simply further clog an already overloaded judicial
system.
Because media countersuits have been based on the 1983 version
of Rule 11 more often than on any other statutes or rules, the now
"toothless" revised Rule 11 of 1993 is not expected to act as a strong
incentive to media organizations who contemplate countersuing in
what they consider to be frivolous libel suits. However, the revised
Rule 11 will have little impact on media organizations that base
countersuits on abuse of process, malicious prosecutions, state laws
and rules, or common law.
Clearly, more media defendants are willing to fight back now
than ever before. Their often bold rhetoric, however, is tempered by
the sobering realization, that even if they emerge victorious, their tan-
gible rewards might pale in comparison to the time, money, and en-
ergy they would have to expend. As media attorney Bruce Sanford
noted, "Any libel defendant will still have to avoid the knee-jerk reac-
tion to countersue, counterclaim or move for costs, simply because it
has meritorious defenses to a libel claim."2"
264. Sanford, supra note 5, at 17.
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